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BOOK REVIEW
LEARNING FROM HISTORY IN THE
CIGARETTE DEBATE
Cassandra Tate. Cigarette Wars: The Triumph of "The Little
White Slaver. "New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. viii +
204 pp.
Jonathan L. Entint
HISTORY, ACCORDING TO HENRY FORD, is bunk.
Ford also opposed cigarettes, which he denounced as "little
white slavers;" he objected to them so strenuously that he re-
fused to hire smokers.' Ford's attitude was hardly unusual.
Cigarettes were objects of obloquy in much of the country dur-
ing the first quarter of the twentieth century, with reformers
seeking to restrict if not outlaw their use. Cassandra Tate has
chronicled that largely unknown campaign in a very engaging
book that anyone interested in contemporary efforts to regulate
smoking would do well to read. Despite Ford's skepticism about
history, many of the strategies that Americans are now debating
have antecedents that go back to the Progressive era. Under-
standing what happened then could help us formulate more in-
telligent policies now.
I
Two personalities dominate the story of the first cigarette
war: James B. Duke and Lucy Page Gaston. Duke, who pre-
ferred to chew rather than smoke tobacco and forbade the
women in his family to smoke,2 effectively invented the ciga-
" Professor of Law and Political Science, Case Western Reserve University.
See CASSANDRA TATE, CIGARETTE WARs: THE TRIUMPH OF "THE LITTLE
WHITE SLAVER" 55 (1999).




rette industry. Taking over his family's struggling pipe tobacco
company in 1881, he decided to concentrate on making ciga-
rettes at a time when they made up just one percent of the do-
mestic tobacco market.3 Duke took this gamble because the
company was having trouble competing against its cross-town
rival, which made the dominant Bull Durham products, and be-
cause Congress was about to cut the federal cigarette tax by
more than 70 percent, which would make cigarette manufactur-
ing more profitable.4 Duke revolutionized the industry by per-
fecting a method for curing tobacco that made his cigarettes
milder to smoke and by mechanizing the business, which made
it possible to produce huge quantities at lower cost than his
competitors. 5 By 1890 he had created the American Tobacco
Company and soon controlled 90 percent of a growing market.6
The company continued to thrive even after the Supreme Court
ordered its break-up in 1911 for violating the antitrust laws.
Gaston was the leading opponent of cigarettes. Born within
three years of Duke, she taught school in Illinois for several
years and was drawn to the crusade against tobacco by the sight
of boys who sneaked smokes outside the classroom.8 Deeply
religious and active in the Women's Christian Temperance Un-
ion, she became a journalist in the new town of Harvey, Illinois,
where she lived with or near her parents for the rest of her life.9
She began crusading against both alcohol and tobacco with the
WCTU but focused her energy increasingly on the latter.'0 In
late 1899 Gaston founded the Anti-Cigarette League of America
and was closely associated with that organization for the next
twenty years before she was forced out over her vitriolic
opposition to supplying American troops with cigarettes during
World War I."
Gaston attracted influential allies to the League, including
Ford, Thomas Edison, Dr. John Harvey Kellogg (a noted advo-
3 See id. at 11.
4 See id. at 12, 14.
5 See id. at 15-16.
6 See id. at 16, 36, 45.
7 See United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
8 See TATE, supra note 1, at 41.
9 See id. at 41-43.
10 See id. at 44-45.
' See id. at 39, 62-63. Earlier, Gaston's zealotry led to her brief ouster as the
League's superintendent in 1902; she was quickly restored to her position the follow-
ing year. See id. at 62.
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cate of healthful living and founder of the cereal company that
bears his name), Harvey W. Wiley (the Department of Agricul-
ture's chief chemist and later the first head of the Food and
Drug Administration), and David Starr Jordan (the first presi-
dent of Stanford University).' 2 The League also attracted sup-
port from prominent members of the Protestant clergy, the lead-
ers of the Salvation Army and the YMCA, powerful merchants
like Julius Rosenwald of Sears Roebuck and John Wanamaker,
and Andrew Carnegie. 13 The cigarette opponents were a diverse
coalition, concerned less with health than with morality and
economic efficiency.14 They succeeded in obtaining laws in
more than a dozen states that effectively outlawed cigarettes,
received serious consideration for similar legislation in more
than twenty others, and saw smoking bans adopted at the local
level and by numerous employers. 15 Some of the laws were suc-
cessfully challenged, but the movement took solace from a Su-
preme Court ruling upholding Tennessee's cigarette ban.'
6
World War I marked a crucial turning point, however.
Within a decade the movement had effectively collapsed.' 7 The
war effort and the subsequent growth of smoking, especially
among women, were the main causes. Providing cigarettes to
the troops became a patriotic crusade, on the theory that smok-
ing would divert the soldiers from worse vices.18 So intense was
the fervor that private groups like the YMCA, the Salvation
Army, and the Red Cross, all of which had opposed smoking
before the war, distributed billions of cigarettes to the fighting
men in Europe,' 9 and a proposal by the chairman of the Senate
military affairs committee to ban cigarettes and other tobacco
products from military facilities was implausibly denounced as
12 See id. at 49.
"3 See id. at 51-52, 54-55.
14 See id. at 8, 53. Indeed, mainstream medical professionals remained aloof
from the campaign against cigarettes until relatively recently, largely because physi-
cians regarded tobacco opponents as eccentrics or crackpots and were therefore reluc-
tant to endorse the idea that smoking might be a health hazard. See id. at 143.
15 See id. at 54-58.
16 See Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U.S. 343 (1900); TATE, supra note 1, at 5, 27,
56. For further discussion of this case, see infra notes 28-37 and accompanying text.
17 Only restrictions on sales to minors, which were adopted everywhere, sur-
vived. The last general statewide cigarette ban, in Kansas, was repealed in 1927. See
TAr, supra note 1, at 120. The movement's last gasp came in 1930 with the over-
whelming rejection of an Oregon anticigarette initiative. See id. at 135-36.
18 See id. at 65-67, 71-72, 88.
19 See id. at 76-82.
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a device for deterring enlistment. 20 Those efforts and the
"smokes for soldiers" campaigns organized by newspapers and
civic groups around the country helped to undercut the moral
objections to cigarettes.2 ' That, in turn made cigarettes more
acceptable to polite society after the war. At the same time,
smoking became increasingly popular among women who were
seeking to break down traditional gender roles.22 Tate is particu-
larly effective in debunking the claim that a famous advertising
gimmick - Edward Bernays' arranging to have debutantes carry
lighted cigarettes as "torches of freedom" in the 1929 Easter
parade in New York City - set the stage for women's smoking;
many women were already smoking despite the persistence of
opposition to what previously had been widely denounced as an
unladylike practice. 3 But even as the movement collapsed,
medical researchers were beginning to examine the link be-
tween smoking and health that would provide the basis for the
Surgeon General's 1964 report and the modern campaign
against tobacco.24
Tate skillfully analyzes the rise and fall of the early cam-
paign against cigarettes. She carefully documents the tensions
within the campaign, with its divergent roots in religious reviv-
alism and secular progressivism, thoughtfully explains the am-
bivalence of many temperance activists who opposed cigarettes
but hesitated to seek a federal ban lest they dilute the national
effort against alcohol following the adoption of the Eighteenth
Amendment, and illuminates the social and economic factors
and interpersonal rivalries that contributed to the movement's
demise. Most significant, she makes clear that the early cam-
paign against cigarettes foreshadowed contemporary debates on
the subject even though the focus of concern has apparently
20 See id. at 73-74. The sponsor of this proposal was Senator George E. Cham-
berlain, an Oregon Democrat who strongly supported American involvement and
repeatedly criticized President Wilson for not prosecuting the war vigorously enough.
See SEWARD W. LIVERMORE, POLITICS IS ADJOURNED: WOODROW WILSON AND THE
WAR CONGRESS, 1916-1918, at 81-90 (1966); Sheldon Bernard Avery, A Private
Civil War: The Controversy Between George E. Chamberlain and Woodrow Wilson
41-45, 53-54, 59-62, 64-65, 70-84, 86-88 (June 1967) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Uni-
versity of Oregon) (on file with author).
21 See TATE, supra note 1, at 65, 84.
22 See id. at 95, 106-07, 109-10.
23 See id. at 105-06, 110-14.
24 See id. at 120, 139-40; PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH: REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COM-
MITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 142 (1964)).
[Vol. 10:205
changed from morality to health. What Tate does not do so well
is to explain the basis for the various judicial rulings on the va-
lidity of various cigarette restrictions or to explore the implica-
tions of those rulings for contemporary proposals to restrict
cigarettes.
II
Tate properly recognizes that the legal aspect of the cam-
paign against cigarettes had mixed results. Anticigarette legisla-
tion was adopted primarily in places where smoking was al-
ready unpopular, and the laws generally went unenforced even
there.25 The courts invalidated some measures, and the rest were
soon repealed. 26 Beyond these factual details, however, the au-
thor's discussion of legal questions is distressingly superficial.
Tate does not identify a single case by name, offers only the
most cursory explanation of the court decisions to which she
refers, and sometimes clearly misunderstands judicial reason-
ing.27 A more complete analysis of this topic should interest not
only lawyers but anyone concerned with current policy debates
about tobacco.
The leading case in the campaign was Austin v. Tennes-
see,28 a 1900 Supreme Court ruling that upheld a state law pro-
hibiting the importation or transfer of cigarettes. A bare 5-4
majority upheld this statute against a Commerce Clause chal-
lenge. In some respects this decision seems like an anachro-
nism, because the Court relied on the since-rejected original-
package doctrine under which states were allowed to regulate
out-of-state goods only if their original package had been bro-
25 See id. at 60-61.
26 See supra note 17.
27 For example, Tate says that the state supreme court held an Illinois cigarette
ban for which Gaston energetically lobbied unconstitutional. See TATE, supra note 1,
at 59. In fact, the court held that the measure did not prohibit the sale of all cigarettes,
only those that had been adulterated with other harmful substances. See People ex rel.
Berlizheimer v. Busse, 83 N.E. 175, 175-76 (il. 1907). The court explained that it
was construing the statute narrowly because the title of the act referred to regulation
rather than prohibition of cigarettes, because a statute containing broader language
than its title describes is unconstitutional. Tate fails to appreciate the difference be-
tween narrow construction and invalidation; she simply quotes the court's statement
that the state could forbid cigarette sales under a properly drafted statute. See TATE,
supra note 1, at 174 n.75. For another instance in which the author apparently mis-
reads a judicial opinion, see infra note 41.
28 179 U.S. 343 (1900); see supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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ken.2 9 Even in its own terms, Austin might not have applied the
doctrine properly. The Court focused on the baskets in which
the cigarettes had been shipped rather than the individual boxes
in which they were sold. 30 This ran counter to the consistent
view of the lower federal courts, which generally struck down
state laws by emphasizing that the boxes were the original
packages.31
Nevertheless, Austin might have reached a defensible re-
sult. Modem doctrine under the Dormant Commerce Clause fo-
cuses on whether the state regulation discriminates against out-
of-state goods32 or unduly burdens interstate commerce.3 3 There
is no reason to believe that Tennessee, or any of the other states
that adopted similar measures against cigarette manufacturing,
sales, or transfers, cared that cigarettes were produced else-
29 See Austin, 179 U.S. at 350-63. One of the leading cases on the original-
package doctrine was Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890) (invalidating a state law
prohibiting the importation of alcoholic beverages as applied to products in their
original packages). The doctrine arose from the following comment by Chief Justice
Marshall:
It is sufficient for the present to say, generally, that when the importer has
so acted upon the thing imported, that it has become incorporated and
mixed up with the mass of property in the country, it has, perhaps, lost its
distinctive character as an import, and has become subject to the taxing
power of the state; but while the remaining the property of the importer, in
his warehouse, in the original form or package in which it was imported, a
tax upon it is too plainly a duty in imports the escape the prohibition in the
Constitution.
Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 441-42 (1827). The Court repudiated
this approach in Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976) (upholding a
nondiscriminatory property tax on inventory regardless of whether imported goods
remained in their original packages).
" See Austin, 179 U.S. at 360-61. But see id. at 380 (Brewer, J., dissenting)
(focusing on the boxes rather than the shipping baskets and emphasizing that "there
had been no breaking of any [original] package").
31 See, e.g., Sawrie v. Tennessee, 82 F. 615 (C.C.M.D. Tenn. 1897) (striking
down the identical law upheld in Austin by focusing on the boxes rather than the
shipping baskets); Iowa v. McGregor, 76 F. 956 (C.C.N.D. Iowa 1896) (overturning
conviction for importing cigarettes after treating boxes of cigarettes as original pack-
ages); In re Minor, 69 F. 233 (C.C.D.W. Va. 1895) (holding that a statute requiring
that cigarettes imported from another state be repackaged before sale violates the
Commerce Clause). At least one state court took a similar approach during the pre-
Austin period. See State v. Goetze, 27 S.E. 225 (W. Va. 1897) (holding that imported
cigarettes may be sold in their original packages).
32 See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (invalidat-
ing statutory ban on importation of out-of-state waste)).
33 See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (invalidating state
ban on shipment of uncrated cantaloupe because the burden on interstate commerce
outweighed the law's benefits).
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where. The goal was not to protect in-state interests from out-
of-state competition but rather to address a problem of public
health and welfare. Both the majority and the dissenters in Aus-
tin recognized that cigarettes were widely perceived as harm-
ful. 34 What divided the Court in that case was the deference to
be shown to the legislature. The majority thought the legislative
judgment was entitled to respect,35 whereas the dissenters found
inadequate justification for the ban.36 In light of the widespread
agreement, now endorsed even by the tobacco industry, that
cigarettes pose significant public health risks, a nondiscrimina-
tory state law such as the one upheld in Austin would likely
prevail against a constitutional challenge today.
37
We are unlikely to find out very soon whether a general
ban on cigarettes could pass muster because current policy de-
bates have focused on other approaches such as tort actions
38
34 See Austin, 179 U.S. at 348-49, 361-62 (majority opinion); id. at 368
(Brewer, J., dissenting).
35 See id. at 348 ("Without undertaking to affirm or deny their evil effects, we
think it within the province of the legislature to say how far [cigarettes] may be sold
.. "), 361 ("There is doubtless fair ground for dispute as to whether the use of ciga-
rettes is not hurtful to the community, and therefore it would be competent for a
State, with reference to its own people, to declare, under penalties, that cigarettes
should not be manufactured within its limits").
36 See id. at 368 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
No one can question the sincerity of the legislature of Tennessee in... en-
acting what it deemed for the health of its citizens ... such legislation by
reason of the greatness of the supposed evil which it was intended to re-
strain. And yet there is no consensus of opinion as to the fact of such evil.
Id.
37 Cf. National Paint & Coatings Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 45 F.3d 1124,
1130-32 (7 1h Cir. 1995) (rejecting Dormant Commerce Clause challenge to facially
neutral municipal ordinance forbidding all sales of spray paint within city limits in
order to combat graffiti), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1143 (1995).
38 The most prominent example involves the lawsuits filed by state attorneys
general that were settled in 1998. This litigation has generated additional disputes,
primarily over the fees for private lawyers retained by various states. See, e.g., State
v. American Tobacco Co., 772 So. 2d 417 (Ala. 2000) (invalidating a contingent-fee
contract but holding that private counsel were entitled to quantum merit payment);
State v. American Tobacco Co., 723 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1998) (rejecting advance pay-
ment to private lawyers before settlement was final); Philip Morris, Inc. v. Glen-
dening, 709 A.2d 1230 (Md. 1998) (upholding the validity of contingent-fee contract
for private counsel retained by the attorney general); see also In re Fordice, 691 So.
2d 429 (Miss. 1997) (declining, on ripeness grounds, to resolve a dispute between
governor and attorney general over authority to decide whether to sue tobacco com-
panies). Private plaintiffs have also sued tobacco companies for smoking-related
injuries. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (finding no
federal preemption of state-law claims based on express warranty, fraud, and misrep-
2000]
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and federal regulation. 39 But some contemporary methods of
restricting cigarettes are not entirely original. Analogous strate-
gies were used during the earlier campaign, as Tate explains,
and some resulted in litigation that could have current rele-
vance. Let us consider a few examples. Employers recently
have adopted policies that forbid workers from smoking not
only on the job but also in some instances on their own time.
State and local governments have promulgated many of these
policies. Several courts have upheld such policies against con-
stitutional attack.40 Three-quarters of a century ago, state courts
declined to overturn rules prohibiting public school teachers
from smoking in public.41 Similarly, many jurisdictions today
have adopted restrictions on smoking in the workplace and pub-
lic accommodations. These restrictions have been the subject of
intense lobbying42 and, in some instances, lawsuits.43 Efforts to
restrict smoking in public also date back to the anticigarette
campaign that Tate chronicles. State courts before World War I
invalidated blanket prohibitions on public smoking but sug-
gested that narrower restrictions limited to streetcars, theaters,
resentation); see also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993) (permitting an inmate
to sue state prison officials for exposing him to cruel and unusual punishment
through involuntary exposure to environmental tobacco smoke).
39 See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (hold-
ing that FDA lacks statutory authority to regulate tobacco products).
40 See, e.g., Grusendorf v. City of Oklahoma City, 816 F.2d 539 ( 10th Cir. 1987)
(upholding ban on smoking by firefighter trainees); City of North Miami v. Kurtz,
653 So. 2d 1025 (Fla. 1995) (upholding ban on smoking by all job applicants), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 1043 (1996); Town of Plymouth v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 686
N.E.2d 188 (Mass. 1997) (upholding mandatory dismissal of police officer for smok-
ing).
41 See Clark v. State Bd. of Examiners, 135 A. 790 (N.J. 1927); TATE, supra
note 1, at 112. Here again the author misreads a judicial ruling. Tate says that the
Clark court upheld the teacher's position but in fact the appeal was dismissed be-
cause Ms. Clark had not exhausted her administrative remedies. State education au-
thorities ultimately ruled in the teacher's favor without judicial compulsion. See
"Smoking" Teacher Wins, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 7, 1928, at 8. Meanwhile, another court
upheld a rule prohibiting students at a state teacher's college from smoking. See
Tanton v. McKenney, 197 N.W. 510 (Mich. 1924).
42 See, e.g., Clifford J. Levy, Quietly, Tobacco Giant Fights Local Smoking
Bans, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1999, at BI (reporting on the efforts of Philip Morris to
oppose state and local smoking restrictions in New York).
4 Compare, e.g., Fagan v. Axelrod, 550 N.Y.S.2d 552 (Sup. Ct. 1990) (uphold-
ing state law on smoking in public accommodations), with, e.g., Boreali v. Axelrod,
523 N.Y.S.2d 464 (1987) (invalidating administrative regulations concerning indoor
smoking), and Cookie's Diner, Inc. v. Columbus Bd. of Health, 640 N.E.2d 1231
(Franklin County Mun. Ct. 1994) (same).
[Vol. 10:205
BOOK REVIEW
and other confined accommodations might be justifiable. 44 Then
there is the question of parental smoking in the home, which has
generated increasing debate nowadays.4 Even that question was
the subject of litigation earlier.46 Further, there is lively debate
over the constitutionality of restrictions on cigarette advertis-
ing.47 The federal ban on broadcast ads survived a First
Amendment challenge,48 but local regulations have generated
conflicting rulings. 49 Even this issue arose during the earlier
campaign, and the Supreme Court upheld a state advertising
prohibition. 50
44 See City of Zion v. Behrens, 104 N.E. 836 (IIl. 1914); Hershberg v. City of
Barbourville, 133 S.W. 985 (Ky. 1911). See also TATE, supra note 1, at 56, 128-29.
45 See, e.g., Kristin L. Johnson, Comment, An Argument for Consideration of
Prenatal Smoking in Neglect and Abuse Determinations, 46 EMORY L.J. 1661 (1997)
(favoring restrictions on smoking by pregnant women); Michele L. Tyler, Note,
Blowing Smoke: Do Smokers Have a Right? Limiting the Privacy Rights of Cigarette
Smokers, 86 GEo. L.J. 783, 795-800 (1998) (supporting restrictions on parental
smoking in the home due to adverse health effects on children); Victoria L. Wend-
ling, Note, Smoking and Parenting: Can They Be Adjudged Mutually Exclusive Ac-
tivities? 42 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1025 (1992) (opposing restrictions on parental
smoking).
46 See, e.g., Shallcross v. Shallcross, 122 S.W. 223 (Ky. 1909) (finding a di-
vorced father's smoking to be a relevant factor in denying him visitation rights with
his children); see also TATE, supra note 1, at 102, 112-13.
47 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitution and the Cathedral: Prohibit-
ing, Purchasing, and Possibly Condemning Tobacco Advertising, 93 Nw. U. L. REv.
1143 (1999) (concluding that advertising restrictions are permissible); Martin H.
Redish, Tobacco Advertising and the First Amendment, 81 IOWA L. REv. 589 (1996)
(arguing that advertising restrictions are unconstitutional).
4 See Capital Broad. Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971) (3-judge
court), aff'd mem. sub nom. Capital Broad. Co. v. Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972);
TATE, supra note 1, at 153-54.
49 See, e.g., Lindsey v. Tacoma-Pierce County Health Dep't, 195 F.3d 1065 (91h
Cir. 1999) (holding that a local ban on outdoor tobacco advertising is preempted by
the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA)); Greater N.Y. Metro.
Food Council, Inc. v. Giuliani, 195 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding a municipal regu-
lation of tobacco ads to be preempted by the FCLAA, but upholding limits on the
placement of such advertisements); Federation of Adver. Indus. Representatives, Inc.
v. City of Chicago, 189 F.3d 633 (7zh Cir. 1999) (finding a city ordinance restricting
public advertisement of cigarettes), cert. denied 529 U.S. 1066 (2000); Penn Adver-
tising of Baltimore, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 63 F.3d 1318 (4' Cir. 1995) (uphold-
ing a city ordinance prohibiting cigarette advertising on billboards located in desig-
nated zones as not preempted by the FCLAA), vacated and remanded, 518 U.S. 1030
(1996), adhered to on remand, 101 F.3d 332 (4' Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S.
1204 (1997).
50 See Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932). But see Post Printing &
Publ'g Co. v. Brewster, 246 F. 321 (D. Kan. 1917) (finding a state ban on cigarette
advertising unconstitutional as applied to an out-of-state newspaper that circulated
20001
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This does not mean that contemporary legal disputes about
cigarettes must necessarily be resolved in the same way as the
earlier ones. Legal doctrine has changed, sometimes dramati-
cally, over the past century. This is most apparent in the adver-
tising context, where commercial speech received no constitu-
tional protection at all until 1976.51 That fact explains why ear-
lier legal challenges to advertising restrictions focused on due
process, equal protection, and the Commerce Clause rather than
the First Amendment.52 But many current legal arguments about
cigarette regulation were foreshadowed in earlier judicial state-
ments. For instance, bans on off-the-job smoking by public em-
ployees have been upheld on the theory that the government has
a powerful interest in reducing the cost of health care for its
workers.53 Courts that invalidated sweeping bans on smoking in
public before World War I emphasized that cigarettes might
pose health risks when smoked in confined spaces and that re-
ducing those risks might justify more limited smoking restric-
tions of the sort that many jurisdictions have now adopted.54
lI
Despite the gaps in her legal discussion, Tate succeeds in
demonstrating significant continuities between the cigarette de-
bates early in the twentieth century and today. To be sure, the
emphases differed: the early opponents emphasized the immor-
ality of cigarette smoking, whereas today the focus is more
clearly on health risks. Nonetheless, Tate shows that the early
within state); TATE, supra note 1, at 122 (discussing the statute but not the court rul-
ing).
51 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharm. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976) (holding that commercial speech is entitled to qualified First
Amendment protection).
52 See Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932); Post Printing & Publ'g Co. v.
Brewster, 246 F. 321 (D. Kan. 1917). The broadcast-advertising ban was challenged
on First Amendment grounds, see supra note 48 and accompanying text, but the chal-
lenge failed. Not only did the challenge arise at a time when commercial speech en-
joyed no constitutional protection, but the regime of broadcast regulation then in
effect afforded the government much wider latitude to restrict radio and television
than print media. See Capital Broad. Co., 333 F. Supp. at 584, 586.
53 See Grusendorf v. City of Oklahoma City, 816 F.2d 539, 543 (10t' Cir. 1987);
Kurtz v. City of North Miami Beach, 653 So. 2d 1025, 1028-29 (Fla. 1995), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 1043 (1996); Town of Plymouth v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 686 N.E.2d
188, 191 (Mass. 1997).
54 See, e.g., City of Zion v. Behrens, 104 N.E. 836, 837 (Ill. 1914).
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critics had identified most of the health effects of smoking, in-
cluding second-hand smoke.
Moreover, the early campaigners attacked cigarettes on a
wide front. Their initial goal was to prohibit the noxious weed,
but they eventually turned to a regulatory strategy that antici-
pated many of the contemporary approaches. Some smoking
restrictions were explicitly premised on the rights of nonsmok-
ers.5 6 Opponents also came to favor higher cigarette taxes to
depress demand; earlier they had objected to such taxes as giv-
ing implicit approval to an undesirable product, a view that still
has adherents.
Finally, Tate illuminates the social factors that facilitated
the opposition to cigarettes then and now. Both campaigns arose
when smoking was associated with marginal segments of the
population. Before World War I, smokers were primarily immi-
grants from Southern and Eastern Europe; today they are dis-
proportionately blue collar and less educated.58 The first anti-
cigarette movement collapsed when smoking achieved wide-
spread acceptance among the middle and upper classes. 59 Even
during the heyday of smoking, however, cigarette users were a
minority of the adult population.60 Despite the revulsion with
which tobacco is now viewed in many quarters, smoking shows
no sign of disappearing. 61 Tate argues that smoking persists be-
cause it serves a variety of social and psychological functions,
from relaxation to rebellion, for cigarette users.62 The emer-
gence of a smokers' rights movement that has won varying de-
grees of legislative recognition in almost thirty states over the
55 See TATE, supra note 1, at 54, 154. The only significant exception was lung
cancer, which was largely unknown before 1930. See id. at 54, 139-40.
56 See id. at 128.
57 See id. at 127-28. For example, some Ohio legislators recently objected to
raising cigarette taxes as part of a package to reform the state's system of financing
public schools. They thought that using such taxes to support education would le-
gitimize smoking. See Lee Leonard & Catherine Candisky, Cigarette Tax Hike Plan
Rapped, COLUMBus DISPATCH, July 9, 1997, at 6B. Ironically, the state chapters of
three national antismoking organizations endorsed the proposal. See Lee Leonard,
Tax Plan Gets Tepid Reception: School Funding Hearings Set in House, Senate, Co-
LUMBUS DISPATCH, July 3, 1997, at IC.
58 See TATE, supra note 1, at 6, 18.
'9 See id. at 6, 136-37, 153.60 See id. at 119.
61 The adult smoking rate has remained constant at around twenty-five percent
for over a decade. See id. at 147.
62 See id. at 153.
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past decade, 63 as well as the fate of the first anticigarette cam-
paign, suggests that the current debate will be just one chapter
in an essentially permanent national conversation.
63 See id. at 155. For a detailed listing of such measures, see Terry Morehead
Dworkin, It's My Life - Leave Me Alone: Off-the-Job Employee Associational Pri-
vacy Rights, 35 AM. Bus. L.J. 47, 99-103 (1997).
[Vol. 10:205
